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Abstract—Although the management of resources is essential
for realizing a computational grid, providing an efficient re-
source allocation mechanism is a complex undertaking. Since Grid
providers and consumers may be independent bodies, negotia-
tion among them is necessary. The contribution of this paper
is showing that market-driven agents (MDAs) are appropriate
tools for Grid resource negotiation. MDAs are e-negotiation agents
designed with the flexibility of: 1) making adjustable amounts of
concession taking into account market rivalry, outside options,
and time preferences and 2) relaxing bargaining terms in the
face of intense pressure. A heterogeneous testbed consisting of
several types of e-negotiation agents to simulate a Grid comput-
ing environment was developed. It compares the performance
of MDAs against other e-negotiation agents (e.g., Kasbah) in a
Grid-commerce environment. Empirical results show that MDAs
generally achieve: 1) higher budget efficiencies in many market
situations than other e-negotiation agents in the testbed and
2) higher success rates in acquiring Grid resources under high
Grid loadings.
Index Terms—Grid commerce, Grid resource allocation,
negotiation, resource management, software agent.
I. INTRODUCTION
G RID COMPUTING is distinguished from conventionaldistributed computing because it focuses on large-scale
resource sharing [1, p. 200]. Hence, a resource management
system is central to the operation of a Grid [2, p. 135]. A
Grid is a very large-scale network computing system that can
potentially scale to Internet size, and the network computing
system can be viewed as a virtual computer consisting of a
networked set of heterogeneous machines (owned by multiple
organizations) that agrees to share their local resources with
each other [2, p. 135]. Due to its scale, and because resource
owners and consumers may have different goals, preferences,
interests, and policies, providing an efficient resource manage-
ment and coordination mechanism in the Grid is a complex
undertaking. Hence, automatic scheduling programs are needed
to (re)allocate computing resources because of both the com-
plexity of the resource allocation problem and the dynami-
cally changing performance of the Grid resources [3, p. 747].
Agents (or autonomous problem solvers) that can act flexibly
in dynamic environments can provide supportive efforts for
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a computational Grid [4, p. 8]. Sim [5] argued that software
agents, in particular e-negotiation agents, can play an essential
role in realizing the Grid vision. Adopting a market-driven
approach [6], this work attempts to address some of the issues
raised in [5] by designing and building negotiation agents that
participate in Grid-commerce (G-commerce) [3], [7], [8] in a
market-oriented Grid [9]–[11].
1) G-commerce and Market-Oriented Grid: In [3], [7], and
[8], Wolski coined the term G-commerce to refer to compu-
tational economies for controlling the resource allocation in
computational Grid environments. The Grid can be viewed as a
network of computations [12], and computations can be viewed
in economic terms [13, p. 133]. It was noted in [7] and [8] that
casting the Grid resource allocation problem in economic terms
is both intuitive and advantageous.
First, the utilization of Grid resources is not for free [3]. In
a market-oriented Grid, providers can receive royalties for the
(computing and storage) resources and services they provide,
whereas Grid users can attempt to mold the Grid systems to
their needs by exercising their market powers as Grid con-
sumers. In a Grid economy [14, p. 699], resource management
systems should provide the tools and mechanisms for both
providers and consumers to express their requirements and
facilitate the realization of their goals. A Grid economy not
only helps regulate the supply and demand for Grid resources,
but also provides the incentives for providers to contribute
resources and benefit from doing so and offers an efficient
mechanism for managing resources [14, p. 699].
Second, there is an enormous literature on economic theories
and principles for explicating and understanding the emergent
behavior of the Grid and its constituents (participants). It was
also noted in [13, p. 134] that using market models as an
economic organization for computation is effective in promot-
ing efficient and cooperative interactions among entities with
different goals and knowledge.
Third, it was pointed out in [3, p. 748] that many economic
systems and some of their assumptions seem to be familiar (e.g.,
many people can associate price to the supply-and-demand
patterns of resources). Moreover, these economic principles
also extend to artificial decision-making agents in general
[13, p. 134], including software agents and entities.
Finally, it was noted in [14, p. 699] that some of the economic
models for resource allocation include: commodity market
models, auction models, tendering or contract-net models, and
bargaining or negotiation models.
2) Market-Driven G-Negotiation: Whereas [3], [7], and [8]
focused on both commodity markets and auction formulations
1083-4419/$20.00 © 2006 IEEE
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of G-commerce, the contribution of this work is designing a
testbed of negotiation agents for resource management and
allocation in a Grid computing platform. Negotiation activities
are necessary in a computational Grid because of the following
reasons.
1) It cannot be assumed that a resource provider will uncon-
ditionally provide a (computing) capability to a consumer
[4, pp. 12–13].
2) Since Grid participants are independent bodies [10], some
form of mechanism is needed to resolve their differences.
3) Through negotiation, players in a Grid marketplace, i.e.,
resource owners (or service providers) and consumers
[11], are given the opportunity to maximize their return-
on-investment and minimize their cost (the price they
pay), respectively.
Even if a resource provider is willing to provide a service
or to lease a computing resource, one would still be faced with
the question of determining the cost of providing the service
and the desired level of service. Hence, adopting automated
negotiation as a means for establishing contracts and resolving
the differences in the goals, objectives, preferences, access
policies, and supply-and-demand patterns of both providers and
consumers is a topic of considerable interest. Moreover, it was
noted in [15, p. 231] that prices and negotiations can be used to
coordinate the activity of objects and software entities.
To the best of the author’s knowledge, to date, there are only
a few (preliminary) efforts on applying e-negotiation agents
to resource management in Grid computing (e.g., [10] and
[16]–[18]). Additionally, the strategies adopted by these agents
do not take the dynamics of the market into consideration. In
a highly dynamic Grid environment, it is essential to take mar-
ket dynamics into consideration because providers can make
resources/services available to and disconnect from a Grid, and
consumers can enter and withdraw requests, perhaps at machine
speed in both cases.
3) Design Considerations: It is envisioned that negotiation
in a market-oriented Grid must take into consideration the
following:
1) dynamics of the computing environment;
2) speed at which resources are allocated or deallocated.
The availability of resources and the load continuously
vary with time [19, p. 81]. Since resources and services are
constantly being added or removed from the Grid [10], [20],
factor 1) is an essential consideration. Factor 2) is important
because any delay incurred on waiting for a resource assign-
ment is perceived as an overhead [7]. Both factors 1) and
2) collectively help define some of the design considerations
of Grid-resource-negotiation (G-negotiation) agents listed as
follows.
1) Market factors: To optimize their returns, G-negotiation
agents should consider factors such as opportunity and
competition in response to the availability and changing
loads in the Grid (i.e., the dynamics of the computing
environment).
2) Time constraint: G-negotiation agents should be sensitive
to deadlines. In addition to the cost of resource set by
owners and the price a consumer is willing to pay, it was
pointed out in [14, p. 7] that deadline is another important
parameter that can influence the way resource scheduling
is carried out.
3) Tradeoff: G-negotiation agents should be designed to
consider the tradeoff between the benefit of using a
suboptimal (or slightly more expensive) resource that can
be located and allocated more quickly and the benefit
of using the best (or least expensive) resource that may
be more difficult to acquire. For instance, to acquire re-
sources more rapidly, they should be designed to slightly
relax their bargaining criteria (such as accepting a slightly
higher price), especially when the Grid loading is very
high (i.e., many computing resources are occupied). Like
time constraint, this consideration relates to the issue of
the speed at which resources can be allocated, which in
turn relates to the issue of overhead [7].
Even though there are many existing e-Negotiation agents
(e.g., just to name a few: Kasbah [21], and negotiation decision
functions (NDFs) [22]), none of these agents was designed
to take into consideration all the aforementioned three design
issues. For instance, although both Kasbah and NDF model the
devaluation of goods with time using time-dependent NDFs,
they were primarily designed for bilateral negotiations and
did not take into consideration the influence of market fac-
tors. While there are some (but very few) works on build-
ing Grid-negotiation agents [10], [16], [17], most of these
research efforts are preliminary, and both considering market
dynamics and making tradeoff decisions are not among their
research focuses (see Section V). The goal of this research is
to show that market-driven agents (MDAs) (Section II) pre-
viously engineered for e-negotiation are appropriate tools for
G-negotiation because they possess many desirable properties
(see Section II-A) such as being able to negotiate optimally
and make tradeoff decisions. Empirical results obtained from
stochastic simulations using a testbed (Section III-A) to simu-
late a Grid computing environment show that MDAs generally
achieved relatively high budget efficiencies in many market
situations and relatively high success rates in G-negotiation
under high Grid loadings.
II. MARKET-DRIVEN E-NEGOTIATION AGENT
An MDA [23]–[28] is a negotiation agent that was originally
designed for bolstering negotiation activities in e-commerce.
MDAs are e-negotiation agents that incorporate all the design
considerations listed in Section I. An MDA is sensitive to
deadline and model devaluations of goods over time due to
perishing [28]. It takes into consideration the influence of both
market rivalry as well as trading options. The novel features
of an MDA are its abilities to make: 1) adjustable amounts
of concession by reacting to different market conditions and
bargaining constraints and 2) tradeoff decisions for reaching
a consensus with a higher probability by slightly relaxing its
bargaining terms.
1) Reacting to Market Situations: An MDA determines
the appropriate amount of concession using three NDFs:
time, competition, and opportunity. It makes concession by
narrowing the difference kt between its proposal and the
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counterproposal of its opponent in a negotiation round t. In
determining the amount of concession, an MDA uses the time,
competition, and opportunity functions to determine the ex-
pected difference kt+1 in its proposal and the counterproposal
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kt.
2) Time Function: In a bilateral negotiation, the decision of
an MDA is generally influenced by time. The time-dependent
function T (t, τ, λ) models the intuition that as time passes,
an MDA relaxes its proposal by attempting to narrow its dif-
ference(s) with the counterproposal(s) of other parties using:
T (t, τ, λ) = 1− (t/τ)λ, where t is the current trading time,
τ is the deadline, and λ is an MDA’s time preference. Whereas
deadline puts negotiators under pressure [29, p. 67], an MDA
has different time preferences (e.g., negotiators with different
time preferences may adopt different concession rates with
respect to time) [30, pp. 32–33]. In an MDA, the concession
rate is determined with respect to 0 < λ <∞. With infinitely
many values of λ, there are infinitely many possible strategies in
making concession with respect to the remaining trading time.
However, they can be classified as follows.
1) Linear: λ = 1 and kt+1 = [T (t, τ, λ)]kt = [1− (t/τ)]kt.
At any round t, an MDA makes a constant rate of conces-
sion ∆t = kt − kt+1. At the deadline t = τ , kτ = [1−
(τ − 1/τ)]kτ−1 and kτ+1 = [1− (τ/τ)]kτ = 0. Hence,
∆τ = kτ − kτ+1 = kτ (an MDA expects and attempts to
narrow the difference completely at the deadline).
2) Conciliatory: kt+1 = [1− (t/τ)λ]kt, where 0 < λ < 1.
An MDA makes larger concessions in the early trading
rounds and smaller concessions at the later stage.
3) Conservative: kt+1 = [1− (t/τ)λ]kt, where 1 < λ <∝.
An MDA makes smaller concessions in early rounds and
larger concessions in later rounds.
In all the above strategies, for all ∆t (including ∆τ ), there is
an additional constraint [28, p. 715] requiring that for a buyer
agentB (respectively, a seller agent S), lBt + ∆t ≤ RPB , where
RPB is B’s reserve price, and lBt is B’s proposal at round t
(respectively, lSt −∆t ≥ RPS , where RPS is S’s reserve price,
and lSt is S’s proposal at round t). If lBt + ∆t > RPB (re-
spectively, lSt −∆t < RPS), then negotiation terminates with
a conflict.
3) Opportunity Function: In a multilateral negotiation,
having outside options may give a negotiator more bargaining
“power.” However, negotiations may still break down if
the proposals between two negotiators are too far apart.
The opportunity function O(nBt , v
B→Sj
t , 〈wSj→Bt 〉) = (1−∏nBt
j=1(v
B→Sj
t − wSj→Bt )/(vB→Sjt − cB)) determines the
amount of concession based on: 1) trading alternatives (number
of trading partners nBt ) and 2) differences in utilities (vB→Sjt )
generated by the proposal of an MDA and the counterpro-
posal(s) of its trading partner(s) (〈wSj→Bt 〉) [6], [24], [28].
Details of deriving the opportunity function are given in [6],
[24], and [28].
4) Competition Function: MDAs are designed for multi-
lateral negotiations, and rivalry in an e-market is inherent.
The amount of competition of an MDA is determined by the
probability that it is not being considered as the most preferred
partner. The competition function C(mBt , nBt ) determines the
probability that an agent B is ranked as the most preferred trad-
ing partner by at least one other agent at round t [6], [24], [28].
If B has mBt − 1 competitors, and nBt trading partners, then,
C(mBt , n
B
t ) = 1− [(mBt − 1)/mBt ]nBt . Details of deriving the
competition function are given in [6], [24], and [28].
5) Relaxing Bargaining Terms: An MDA uses a set of fuzzy
rules to determine when it should relax its bargaining terms in
the hope of having a higher chance of reaching a consensus.
Augmented with a fuzzy decision controller (FDC) (see [26]),
Sim’s enhanced MDAs (EMDAs) are programmed to slightly
relax their bargaining terms in the face of intense pressure (e.g.,
urgent need to acquire a resource or facing fast approaching
deadlines). Since notions such as “very slight” difference in
proposals, “strong” competition, and “fast” approaching dead-
line are vague, an FDC, together with a set of 16 fuzzy rules,
were used in [26] to guide EMDAs in making decision when
relaxing their aspirations. In relaxing its bargaining terms, an
EMDA is influenced by factors such as competition (c), and its
eagerness (ε). ε represents how urgent it is for an EMDA to
acquire a resource before a deadline [26] and ε = 1/λ, because
an EMDA that is more (respectively, less) eager to reach a
consensus will adopt a strategy with a smaller (respectively,
larger) value of λ. Both c and ε form the antecedents of the
fuzzy rules, while the amount of relaxation η is the consequent.
Whereas c and ε are the inputs to the FDC, η represents the
amount that an EMDA would relax its bargaining terms in a
given situation (the output of the FDC). Conciliatory strategies
are not adopted in EMDAs because Sim [6] has proven that,
with shorter deadlines, MDAs adopting Conciliatory strategies
are more likely to achieve lower utilities even though they
face lower risk of losing deals to other competitors. EMDAs
are already designed with a set of fuzzy rules to relax their
bargaining terms in the face of intense negotiation pressure such
as short deadlines. Such a design complements the adoption of
only conservative and linear strategies that are more likely to
achieve higher utilities, but face higher risks of losing the deal
to other agents (perhaps in the face of high competition).
A. Desirable Properties
MDAs possess many desirable properties of negotiation
mechanisms prescribed in [31] (e.g., being stable and selecting
the best-response strategy to maximize utility). Consequently,
MDAs also satisfy many of the criteria of a market model
for Grid resource allocation mentioned in [11]. Additionally,
MDAs negotiate optimally by responding to changing market
conditions and are able to make tradeoff decisions.
1) Negotiating Optimally: An agent receives a utility of
zero if it never trades [30, p. 152] or is unsuccessful in trading
(because disagreement is the worst outcome [30, p. 33]).
Hence, both: 1) size of the possible payoffs and 2) probability
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of achieving these payoffs are essential. Although conceding
more increases the probability of reaching a deal, it is inefficient
because an agent “wastes” some of its utility. However, if an
agent concedes too little, it runs the risk of losing a deal. In [25]
and [28], Sim has proven that MDAs make minimally sufficient
concessions (see [28, Lemmas 4.1–4.2 and Proposition 4.1,
pp. 718–719]). Hence, they avoid making excessive conces-
sions in favorable markets and inadequate concessions in
unfavorable markets. This distinguishing property of MDAs
enables them to optimize their returns in different e-market
situations. Whereas previous theoretical analyses showed that
MDAs can negotiate optimally in different market situations by
making minimally sufficient concessions, empirical results in
this work (see Section IV) demonstrate that in a simulated Grid
computing environment, MDAs can successfully negotiate
Grid resources while achieving relatively high utilities in
different market situations.
2) Making Tradeoff Decisions: Previous empirical results in
[26, pp. 1605–1607] obtained from extensive stochastic simu-
lations in a wide variety of market conditions showed that by
slightly relaxing bargaining terms (at the expense of achieving
slightly lower average utilities), the success rates of EMDAs are
enhanced in many e-market situations. This is essential because
successfully acquiring the necessary resource even though at
the expense of paying a (slightly) suboptimal price is crucial
in ensuring efficient operations in a computational Grid. It may
be more beneficial for a Grid resource scheduling system if a
G-negotiation agent acquires a resource more rapidly or with
more certainty by perhaps paying a slightly higher price pro-
vided that more jobs in the system can be accomplished.
3) Stability and Sequential Equilibrium: Mathematical
analyses in [25] showed that the conservative strategy
(Section II) is an MDA’s best-response (optimal) strategy re-
gardless of the strategy adopted by its opponent. It was proven
in [25] that S (a seller MDA) achieves the best utility regardless
of whether B (a buyer MDA) adopts the conservative, the
linear, or the Conciliatory strategy. Furthermore, it was proven
in [25] that the conservative strategy is the best response for
an MDA at every of its decision points, and, thus satisfies
the notion of sequential rationality [32] (see [25, Lemmas
3.1–3.2 and Proposition 3, pp. 36–39]). Hence, an MDA’s
strategy is optimal whenever it has to move, given its belief
and other agents’ beliefs. Consequently, the strategies adopted
by MDAs are stable. Stability is an essential property because
a negotiation agent that is stable requires fewer computational
resources to outguess its opponents [33, p. 21] or to speculate
about strategies of others [34, p. 8].
III. MARKET-DRIVEN G-NEGOTIATION AGENTS
To demonstrate the application of MDAs in G-negotiation,
a testbed (Section III-A) to simulate a Grid computing en-
vironment has been developed. Since the testbed facilitates
the comparison between MDAs and other negotiation agents,
the basis for comparing these agents in the same testbed is
explicated in Section III-B. This section also discusses the
interactions of agents (Section III-C) in the testbed and the
negotiation protocol of G-negotiation agents (Section III-D).
A. Grid Simulation Testbed
Implemented using the GridSim toolkit [35], the testbed
consists of: 1) a set of Grid resources; 2) a set of resource
consumers; 3) provider agents; 4) consumer agents; 5) a reposi-
tory of resource information; 6) a Grid-resource record agent
(GRRA); and 7) an e-market of heterogeneous negotiation
agents.
1) Grid Resource Providers/Consumers: A Grid resource
provider RPi may possess a series of resources or computing
machines {Mi1, . . . ,Mik}. Each computing machine Mik can
be a single processor, shared memory multiprocessors, or a
distributed memory cluster of computers. Mik can be formed
by one or more processing elements {PE1, . . . ,PEn}, and each
PEi can have different speeds measured in terms of MIPS. In
GridSim [19, p. 94], both a computing machine and a process-
ing element are represented as Java classes gridsim.Machine
and gridsim.PE, respectively. Consequently, with n resource
providers registered in the computational Grid, the list of
computing machines in the Grid can potentially be ({M11, . . . ,
M1i}, . . . , {Mn1, . . . ,Mnk}). A provider RPi is represented
by a provider agent PAi. Each PAi performs the following
functions: 1) registers RPi’s computing resource(s) with the
GRRA and generates a seller agent to negotiate the selling
price of each of the resources of RPi, and 2) if a resource is
leased to a consumer after successful negotiation, PAi receives
computation task(s) sent by a consumer agent CAj representing
a resource consumer RCj , sends the task(s) to the leased com-
puting machine(s) for executions, and returns the computation
results back to CAj . Each resource consumer or application can
have one or more jobs {J1, . . . , Jm}. Each Ji is represented as
a Java class gridsim.Gridlet, and is characterized by a job length
measured in MI, length of input and output data, execution start
and end times, as well as the originator of the job [19, p. 96].
2) Resource Information: The resource information dictio-
nary is a repository of information about the computing re-
sources registered in the Grid. The GRRA updates the resource
information dictionary when a resource joins/leaves the Grid.
3) Heterogeneous e-Market: In the e-market, negotiation
agents are either: 1) buyer agents {B1, . . . , Bm} representing
consumers in negotiating and acquiring resources, or 2) seller
agents {S1, . . . , Sn} representing resource providers negoti-
ating optimal returns for their resources. The problem of Grid
resource allocation is transformed into a problem of bargaining
between and among buyer and seller agents. In a computational
Grid, it is intuitive to think that different providers, as well
as consumers, are likely to adopt different strategies of
negotiation. Although it is acknowledged that there are many
extant negotiation strategies and e-negotiation agents, for the
purpose of simulation and experimentation, the testbed in its
present form only includes negotiation strategies adopted from
MDA, EMDA, Kasbah, and NDF (see Table I). The basis for
comparing with both Kasbah and NDF is given in Section III-B.
In Table I, it can be seen that the strategy set of EMDAs does
not include the Conciliatory strategy. Conciliatory is not
included in the original design of EMDAs [26] because it
was proven in [6] that an agent adopting Conciliatory is more
likely to achieve lower utilities even though it faces lower
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TABLE I
STRATEGIES OF NEGOTIATION AGENTS
risk of losing deals to competitors. Since an EMDA is already
designed with fuzzy rules to relax its bargaining terms in the
face of intense negotiation pressure (e.g., short deadlines),
Conciliatory is not considered in an EMDA’s design. Whereas
the designs of MDA and EMDA are summarized in Section II
and detailed in [24]–[28], the strategies of Kasbah and NDF
are summarized in Section III-B.
B. Basis for Comparing With Kasbah and NDF
The rationale for comparing MDAs and EMDAs with
Kasbah and NDF is that all these agents take into considera-
tion the issue of time constraint, and it is shown below that
NDF and Kasbah have quite similar time-dependent negotiation
strategies to MDAs and EMDAs.
1) Comparing With NDF: Although, on the surface, MDA
and NDF may appear to have different time-dependent NDFs,
it can be shown that, for every strategy in NDF, there is a
corresponding strategy in MDA. For every time-dependent ne-
gotiation strategy S(ψ) in NDF, there is a corresponding time-
dependent negotiation strategy (λ) in MDA, where λ and ψ
are time preferences of an MDA and an NDF agent, respec-
tively, and λ = 1/ψ. This can be demonstrated as follows.
Following [22] and [36], the time-dependent negotiation
function fA(t) of an NDF agent is given as fA(t) = kA +
(1− kA)(min(t, τ)/τ)1/ψ , where t is a discrete trading (ne-
gotiation) time indexed by {0, 1, 2, . . .}, τ is the deadline of
agent A, ψ ∈ R+ (i.e., ψ ≥ 0) represents A’s time preference,
and kA is a constant that when multiplied by the size of the
interval [IPA,RPA] determines the price to be offered in the
first proposal of A. (IPA and RPA are, respectively, the initial
and reserve prices of A). Even though there are infinitely
many strategies for NDF agents (since there are infinitely many
values of ψ), like MDAs, the strategies of NDF agents can be
categorized into three classes as follows.
1) Boulware: For ψ < 1, the initial offer is maintained until
the deadline is almost reached, when A concedes up to its
reserve price.
2) Conceder: For ψ > 1, A rapidly concedes to its reserve
price.
3) Linear: For ψ = 1, A’s price increment is linear.
In NDF, the offer p(t) made at t is defined as follows:
p(t) =
{
IPB + fB(t)(RPB − IPB) for buyer
RPS +
(
1− fS(t)) (IPS − RPS) for seller
where IPB, RPB, IPS, and RPS are the initial and reserve
prices of a buyer agent (B) and a seller agent (S), respectively.
In NDF, 0 ≤ fA(t) ≤ 1 [22], [36], where fA(0) = kA and
fA(τ) = 1. For instance, B’s initial offer is p(0) = IPB +
kA(RPB − IPB). In this testbed, all types of negotiation agents
(including both MDAs and NDF) are designed to follow the
negotiation protocol described in Section III-D, in which all
agents typically start negotiation with their most preferred
deals (i.e., its initial prices). For NDF agents, this is achieved
by substituting kA = 0, so that for 0 ≤ t ≤ τ , fA(t) = 0 +
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RPS + (1− 0)(IPS − RPS) = IPS, t = 0
IPS − ( tτ ) 1ψ (IPS − RPS), 0 < t < τ
RPS + (1− 1)(IPS − RPS) = RPS, t = τ .
Hence, the offer p(t) of a buyer (respectively, seller) NDF agent
at t can be rewritten as follows:
p(t) =
{
IPB + (RPB − IPB) ( tτ ) 1ψ for buyer
IPS − (IPS − RPS) ( tτ ) 1ψ for seller. (1)
For an MDA, if one only considers the time negotiation decision
function, then, the expected difference in the next round kt+1
between the proposal of an agent and its trading partner is







and the amount of concession at t is
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, 0 < t < τ
1, t = τ .
In MDA, the offer lt+1 made at time t+ 1 is given as follows:
lt+1 =
{
lt + ∆t ≤ RPB for buyer
lt −∆t ≥ RPS for seller.












)λ ≥ RPS for seller. (2)
By comparing (1) and (2), even though there are differences be-
tween MDAs and NDF in the ways they compute the offers, the


























Hence, it can be seen that the Boulware (ψ < 1), Conceder
(ψ > 1), and Linear (ψ = 1) strategies in NDF correspond, re-
spectively, to the Conservative (λ > 1), Conciliatory (λ < 1),
and Linear (λ = 1) strategies in MDAs with λ = 1/ψ.
2) Comparing With Kasbah: A seller (respectively, buyer)
Kasbah agent lowers (respectively, raises) its price over a
given time frame following a “decay” function [21]. For a
seller (respectively, buyer) agent, the curve of the “anxious,”
“cool-headed,” and “greedy” strategies follows a linear curve,
an inverse-quadratic (respectively, quadratic) curve, and an
inverse-cubic (respectively, cubic) curve, respectively. Kasbah’s
linear, quadratic, and cubic time decay functions correspond,
respectively, to time-dependent negotiation functions in MDAs
with λ = {1, 2, 3} and in NDF with ψ = {1, 1/2, 1/3}, respec-
tively. Hence, it can be seen that the “anxious,” “cool-headed,”
and “greedy” strategies of Kasbah agents correspond to the
linear strategy in MDAs and to the conservative strategy with
λ = 2 and λ = 3, respectively.
Consequently, even though the agents in the testbed for the
simulation can adopt different strategies, the empirical results
reported in Section IV are tabulated so that the performance of
MDAs adopting conservative strategies with λ = 2 and λ = 3 is
compared to that of NDF agents adopting Boulware strategies
with ψ = 1/2 and ψ = 1/3, and Kasbah agents adopting the
“cool-headed” and “greedy” strategies, respectively. The per-
formance of MDAs adopting λ = 1 is compared to NDF agents
adopting ψ = 1 and Kasbah agents adopting the “anxious”
strategy. Additionally, the performance of MDAs adopting a
Conciliatory strategy with λ = 1/3 is compared to the NDF
agents adopting the Conceder strategy with ψ = 3.
C. Interaction Model
Following [19, p. 87], the interaction protocol among the
agents and entities in the testbed is implemented using events
and is given in Fig. 1. Agents/entities use events for both service
requests and service deliveries.
1) Events: Events are classified into internal events origi-
nating from the same entity, and external events originating
from external entities. Furthermore, an event is a synchronous
event if the event source entity/agent waits until the event
destination entity/agent performs all actions associated with
the event. For instance, in Fig. 1, the provider agent initiates
two synchronous events: “register resource” and “register seller
agent,” both of which must be completed before the resource
can be leased out. An event is asynchronous if the event source
entity initiates an event and continues with other activities
without having to wait for its completion. Except “register
resource,” “register seller agent,” “get resource list,” “get re-
source characteristics,” and “register buyer agent,” all other
events in Fig. 1 are asynchronous. The stages of interaction
among entities are given as follows.
2) Registering Resources and Consumers: At the start of the
simulation, resource provider entities register their resources
through provider agents that send “register resource” events
to the GRRA entity. To facilitate resource trading, provider
agent entities register seller agents with the e-market entity
by sending synchronous events. Depending on users’ requests,
consumer entities query the GRRA entity through consumer
agents, which send synchronous events to: 1) GRRA entity
to obtain the contact details of the resource owners and their
list of registered resources and 2) provider agents to obtain the
characteristics of these resources. The resource characteristics
include the architecture of a computing resource (e.g., HP alpha
server, Sun Fire V480, etc.), operating system (e.g., AIX, Unix,
etc.), list of computing machines (e.g., {M11, . . . ,M1i}), and
expected and reserve prices of leasing a computing machine.
Additionally, to acquire the necessary computing resource,
consumer-agent entities register buyer agents with the e-market
entity by sending synchronous events.
3) G-Negotiation: In the e-market, concurrent negotiation
among multiple pairs of buyer and seller agents is car-
ried out following the G-negotiation protocol described in
Section III-D.
4) Task Execution: If negotiation is successful, the e-market
entity sends the results (e.g., the price for leasing the resource
and the period of utilization) to the consumer agent entity by
raising an asynchronous event. The consumer agent entity sub-
mits the consumer’s task(s) to the provider agent entity, which
in turn submits the task(s) to the provider entity, which services
the task(s). Task executions by providers are represented by
internal events (task(s) processing events), as shown in Fig. 1.
On completion of servicing the task(s), the provider agent entity
sends the results back to the consumer agents by raising one
or more external events.
If negotiation is unsuccessful, the e-market entity sends an
asynchronous event to the provider agent to indicate that its
resource has been released, and, perhaps, the provider may
utilize its resource to service its own task(s).
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Fig. 1. Event diagram for interactions among agents and entities.
D. G-Negotiation Protocol
Negotiation proceeds in a series of rounds as follows. At
round t = 0, the e-market opens. At any round, a buyer (re-
spectively, seller) agent enters the e-market when a consumer
agent places a request for a resource (respectively, a provider
agent registers a resource for lease). Trading begins when there
are at least two agents of the opposite type (i.e., one buyer and
one seller). On the first round of trading, an agent proposes a
deal from their space of possible deals (e.g., the most desirable
price, the least desirable (reserve) price, and those prices in be-
tween). Typically, an agent proposes its most preferred deal ini-
tially. This work adopts Rubinstein’s alternating offers protocol
[37, p. 100], so that a pair of buyer and seller agents negotiates
by making proposals in alternate rounds. Multiple buyer–seller
pairs can negotiate deals simultaneously. If no agreement is
reached, negotiation proceeds to the next round. Negotiation be-
tween two agents terminates: 1) when an agreement is reached
or 2) with a conflict when one of the two agents’ deadline is
reached. An agent (either buyer or seller) can be an MDA,
EMDA, Kasbah agent (KA), or an NDF agent (NDFA). Ad-
ditionally, an agent can adopt any of the strategies listed in
Table I. In the G-Negotiation protocol in this paper, the rules
for reaching a consensus are as follows.
R1) An agreement is reached if an agent B1 and its trading
partner S1 propose deals b1 and o1, respectively, such
that either: 1) b1 ≥ o1 or 2) o1 ≥ b1, where b1 and o1
represent the buying and selling prices of resources.
R2) An agreement is reached if either: 1) η = o1 − b1, such
that η → 0, or 2) η = b1 − o1, such that η → 0, where
η is the amount of relaxation determined using an FDC
described in Section II (details can be found in [26]).
All the four types of agents (i.e. MDA, EMDA, KA, and
NDFA) follow R1, and an agreement is reached when an agent’s
trading partner’s offer matches or exceeds what the agent asked
for. However, only EMDAs follow R2. An EMDA (guided
by a set of fuzzy rules) may also reach a consensus with
other agents if the offer is sufficiently close (albeit, it does
not totally match the EMDA’s bargaining terms)—this is a
novel feature of the negotiation protocol of this work, which
distinguishes it from the protocols in other e-negotiation and
G-negotiation agents. The difference between the negotiation
protocol in [26] and this work is that the G-negotiation protocol
in this work is embedded as part of an interaction protocol
(see Section III-C).
IV. SIMULATIONS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A series of experiments was carried out using the testbed
described in Section III-A. Two major sets of experiments for
evaluating MDAs and EMDAs in G-negotiation were carried
out through stochastic simulations.
1) Objectives and Motivations: The first set of the experi-
ments is designed to explore the influence of market dynamics
on the performance of MDAs, EMDAs, Kasbah, and NDF
agents. The rationale for comparing MDAs and EMDAs with
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TABLE II
INPUT DATA SOURCE
Kasbah and NDF agents is that all these agents take into
consideration the issue of time constraint, and it was shown in
Section III-B that they all have similar time-dependent nego-
tiation strategies. The difference is that whereas MDAs and
EMDAs also take into consideration market factors, such as
opportunity and competition, both Kasbah and NDF agents do
not. By comparing these agents, one can explore and investigate
the influence of market factors on the negotiation outcomes in
an e-market. The second set of the experiments is designed
to study the performance of MDAs, EMDAs, Kasbah, and
NDF agents under different Grid loadings. What distinguishes
EMDAs from the other negotiation agents is that they are
designed to slightly relax their bargaining criteria in the face of
intense pressure. By comparing EMDAs with MDAs, Kasbah,
and NDF, one can study the possible benefits of designing
negotiation agents that slightly relax their bargaining criteria,
especially when the Grid loading is very high.
2) Experimental Settings: As shown in Table II, there are
three input parameters to the testbed: 1) the Grid load; 2) the
e-market type; and 3) deadlines for consumers to complete their
set of tasks.
The Grid load (0 ≤ GL ≤ 1) represents and simulates dif-
ferent levels of utilization of the computing resources in the
Grid. GL is defined here as the ratio of: 1) Rp—the expected
amount of processing requested per time interval and 2) Cc—
the total computing capacity of the Grid. Both Rp and Cc are
measured in millions of instructions (MI). Rp depends on both
the requests (tasks) from the consumers and the average size of
each task. It is assumed that the arrival rate of tasks follows a
Poisson distribution, and the average task size approximates to
10 000 MI with 0% to 10% random variations (for simulation
purpose, such task size is also used in [35, p. 1207]). Different
levels of system utilization (different GL) are simulated by
varying the time interval between the possible arrivals of two
tasks. As GL → 1 (respectively, GL → 0), fewer (respectively,
more) computing resources in the Grid are available for lease.
The e-market type simulates the intuition of supply and
demand and the degree of competition in a Grid computing en-
vironment. There are three types of e-markets: favorable,
balanced, and unfavorable, and they are characterized by
the ratio of buyer agents to seller agents. From a buyer
agent’s perspective, in a favorable (respectively, unfavorable)
e-market, there is a little (respectively, stiff) competition among
buyer agents as there are more (respectively, fewer) resource
providers. For the purpose of simulation, different buyer-to-
seller ratios are simulated by fixing the number of resource
providers but varying the number of consumers that simulta-
neously place their requests at the beginning of the simulation.
The buyer–seller ratios selected (see Table I) are representative
of the three types of e-market. In an (almost) balanced market,
the ratio is simply 1 : 1 since there are (almost) equal number
of buyers and sellers. For unfavorable markets (respectively,
favorable markets), ratios such as 100 : 1, 50 : 1, and 20 : 1 (res-
pectively, 1 : 20, 1 : 50, and 1 : 100) representing extremely un-
favorable (respectively, favorable) trading environments were
not selected. This is because based on the previous experimental
tuning in [26], it was observed that for extremely unfavorable
(respectively, favorable) markets with buyer–seller ratios such
as 100 : 1 (respectively, 1 : 100), the success rates of both MDAs
and EMDAs were generally close to zero. From a buyer’s
perspective, in very unfavorable trading environments, since
only at most one pair of buyer and seller can complete the deal,
the probability that a buyer agent successfully completes a deal
is inherently very low. For instance, for a 100 : 1 buyer–seller
ratio, there is only a probability of 1/100 that a buyer can
complete a deal, if there is at least one seller agent in the
market. Similarly, for a 1 : 100 buyer–seller ratio, there is only
a probability that a seller can complete a deal.
For simulation purpose, a consumer’s deadline for complet-
ing a task is measured in time units. A consumer’s deadline
is randomly generated from the set between 100 and 3600 time
units in steps of 500 (this setting was also used in [35, p. 1207]).
3) Performance Measure: Whereas success rate and utility
are two performance measures used in evaluating MDAs and
EMDAs in e-negotiation, in G-negotiation, it is more prudent
to measure the following:
1) the percentage (PA) of a consumer’s set of tasks that
is accomplished by successfully negotiating and leasing
Grid resources;
2) how efficiently is the available budget spent (Beff).
PA = Nsuc/Ntot, where Ntot is the total number of tasks
requested by a consumer, and Nsuc is the number of tasks that
are successfully scheduled and executed.
Since consumers may be allocated different amounts of
budgets and may have different numbers of tasks, it seems more




where Bbgt is the initial budget allocated to a consumer, and
Bspt is the amount of budget spent in leasing computing
resource(s) for processing tasks that are successfully scheduled
and executed (see Table III). Whereas Nsuc/Bspt represents the
actual number of tasks processed per currency unit measured in
“Grid dollars” or “G$” [3], Ntot/Bbgt represents the expected
number of tasks processed per currency unit before they are
successfully scheduled (and executed).
4) Simulations: The first set of simulations examines the
performance of agents adopting different strategies subject
to different job deadlines and degree of competition. In the





second set of simulations, agents adopting different strategies
are subject to different job deadlines as well as different GL.
5) Results: Empirical results were obtained for all rep-
resentative combinations of the input data (i.e., deadline =
{100, 1600, 3100}, buyer−seller ratio = {10 : 1, 5 : 1, 2 : 1,
1 : 1, 1 : 2, 1 : 5, 1 : 10}, and GL = {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5,
0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0}, and EMDAs (MDAs) adopting λ =
{1/3, 1, 2, 3, 20} corresponding to NDF agents adopting
ψ = {3, 1, 1/2, 1/3, 1/20} together with Kasbah’s strategies
{A(Anxious), C(Cool headed), G(Greedy)} corresponding to
λ = {1, 2, 3}).
In Table IV, 15 combinations of grouping of the simulation
results were plotted for the seven buyer–seller ratios and ten
values of GL. However, due to space limitation, only some of
the graphs are shown in Figs. 2 and 3. For λ = 1/3 and ψ = 3,
there is no corresponding strategy in Kasbah, and EMDAs are
not designed with Conciliatory strategies. Hence, the graphs
in Fig. 2(a) and (b) only show the performance of MDAs and
NDF agents. Similarly, for λ = 20 and ψ = 1/20, there is no
corresponding strategy in Kasbah, and Fig. 2(i) and (j) only
show the performance of MDAs, EMDAs, and NDF agents. For
all other combinations, the performance of all the four agent
types is plotted.
6) Observations: The following observations are made.
1) The budget efficiency for all types of agents increased
as the buyer-to-seller (consumer-to-provider) ratios
decreased.
2) MDAs and EMDAs generally achieved higher budget
efficiency than other negotiation agents, except for un-
favorable markets. However, the difference in budget
efficiency between MDAs (as well as EMDAs) and NDF
(as well as Kasbah) diminishes for higher values of λ
(respectively, lower values of ψ).
3) Under high Grid loadings, EMDAs are generally more
successful in acquiring the resources for executing tasks.
Observation 1) coincides with the common intuition of sup-
ply and demand. When there were many (respectively, few)
consumers and few (respectively, many) providers, buyer agents
had to spend more (respectively, less) for the same resource.
For observation 2), the amount of improvement in the bud-
get efficiency for MDAs and EMDAs over the other types
of agents is significantly more for both favorable markets
[i.e., with buyer−seller ratio = {1 : 2, 1 : 5, 1 : 10}) and
balanced market (buyer−seller ratio = {1 : 1})] than unfa-
vorable markets (buyer−seller ratio = {10 : 1, 5 : 1, 2 : 1}).
Even though in unfavorable markets, the points of all the curves
appear to coincide, the recordings of budget efficiency for
MDAs and EMDAs are still slightly higher, albeit not very
visible. For instance, in Fig. 2(d), for a consumer-to-provider
ratio of 2 : 1, the budget efficiency for MDAs and EMDAs was
1.16, while that of NDF and Kasbah agents was 1.13. This
is because in an unfavorable market, there are fewer available
resources and more competing consumers, and all buyer agents
that complete a bargaining deal with such a weak bargaining
position are likely to acquire a computing resource at a high
price. Whereas MDAs and EMDAs are likely to concede more
in unfavorable markets to avoid making inadequate conces-
sions, all agents (including NDF and Kasbah) that succeeded in
trading had to make a great deal of concessions before reaching
a consensus.
Although space limitation prevents the graphs on success
rates of negotiation for favorable markets from being included
in this paper, all types of agents are generally (100%) suc-
cessful in acquiring resources to complete their tasks, since
there are more available resources and fewer competitors. Since
MDAs and EMDAs are designed to avoid making excessive
concessions in favorable market situations (see Section II-A,
and [25, pp. 717–719]), they are more likely to make compar-
atively smaller concessions than Kasbah and NDF agents in
favorable markets. Hence, it can be seen from Fig. 2 that in
favorable markets, the budget efficiency of MDAs and EMDAs
is visibly higher than Kasbah and NDF. Nevertheless, the
difference between the budget efficiencies of MDAs (as well
as EMDAs) and NDF (as well as Kasbah) decreased as MDAs
adopt strategies with higher λ or correspondingly smaller ψ in
NDF agents (these agents are considered to be more patient
players in [36, p. 2]). The results show that agents adopting a
more “patient” strategy seem to confer more bargaining power
and appear to be less influenced by market dynamics. This
seems to align with an insight mentioned in [38, p. 41] that
“it seems intuitive that for players to have some incentive to
reach agreement, they should find it costly to haggle.” How-
ever, being relatively more patient confers a greater bargaining
power [38, p. 51]. Additionally, it was proven by Sim [6]
that with longer deadlines, MDAs adopting conservative (“pa-
tient”) strategies achieve higher utilities than those adopting
(“impatient”) Conciliatory strategies (see [6, Proposition 5,
p. 627]). In Fig. 2, for deadline = 3100 and a consumer-to-
provider ratio of 1 : 10, the budget efficiency increased from
close to two [Fig. 2(b)] with λ = 1/3, to approximately 2.4, 2.6,
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Fig. 2. Performance under different market situations. (Color version available online at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org.)
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Fig. 3. Performance under different Grid loadings. (Color version available online at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org.)
2.75 [with λ = 1, 2, 3, respectively, in Fig. 2(d), (f), and (h)] to
three [Fig. 2(j) with λ = 20]. A similar trend of increment can
also be observed for NDF with decreasing values of ψ. How-
ever, while adopting more “patient” strategies may confer more
bargaining power, by doing so, agents (with shorter deadlines)
have higher risks of losing deals to other competing agents,
especially in multilateral negotiations (see [6, Proposition 5,
p. 627]). Whereas the influence of market dynamics may di-
minish as agents adopt more “patient” strategies, considering
market dynamics is still essential in multilateral negotiations.
It can be seen from Fig. 3 that observation 3) generally
holds for moderate and long deadlines and different agent
strategies. For long deadlines, all types of agents achieved a
100% success rate in acquiring resources to complete the tasks
for GL ≤ 0.8 (since more resources are available). However, at
extremely high loadings, with GL = {0.9, 1.0}, both EMDAs
and MDAs were more successful than the other negotiation
agents in acquiring resources to complete the tasks. With ex-
tremely high loadings, all agents competed very strongly for
very few available resources. Since MDAs and EMDAs are
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more likely to concede more when there is more competition,
they are more likely to be successful in acquiring resources in
high Grid loading than NDF and Kasbah agents. Furthermore,
EMDAs were generally even more successful than MDAs in
acquiring resources at extremely high Grid loadings. Under
extremely high Grid loadings, EMDAs are more likely than
MDAs to reach agreements with their trading partners since
they are more likely to slightly relax their bargaining criteria
under intense negotiation pressure such as very stiff competi-
tion. The results generally show that by slightly relaxing their
bargaining criteria, EMDAs only outperformed the other agents
in successfully acquiring resource only when the Grid loading
is extremely high. This seems to be a desirable property since it
is plausible to think that negotiation agents should be designed
not to relax their bargaining terms when there is a reasonably
good supply of resources (i.e., “why pay slightly more, when
one has an option to spend slightly less”).
V. RELATED WORK
Since this work explores the issue of applying negotiation
agents for e-commerce to resource negotiation in a compu-
tational Grid, the areas that relate to this research include:
1) e-negotiation agents; 2) G-commerce; and 3) preliminary
initiatives on building agents for G-negotiation.
1) e-Negotiation Agents: The literature in automated nego-
tiation [33] and negotiation agents [39], [40] forms a very
huge collection, and space limitation precludes all existing
negotiation agents from being introduced here. Since more
complete surveys of negotiation agents for e-commerce can be
found in [39] and [40], this section only discusses Kasbah [21]
and NDF [22].
2) Kasbah: Kasbah agents increase/relax their bids/offers at
different rates by adopting the three strategies mentioned in
Section III-A. Although they are not restricted by trading poli-
cies, these strategies have fixed rate adjustments of bids/offers
and do not react to the changing market conditions. Even
though human traders can use deadline as a criterion for
deciding the pattern of concession in Kasbah before trading
commences, such selection did not and could not take into
consideration the ever-changing external influences such as the
increasing number of buyers and sellers at a given time.
3) Negotiation Decision Function (NDF): Faratin et al. [22]
presented a negotiation model that defines a range of
strategies based on time-dependent, resource-dependent, and
behavior-dependent NDFs. Whereas time-dependent NDFs
were compared with the strategies in MDAs in Section III-A,
resource-dependent NDFs generate proposals based on how a
particular resource (e.g., remaining bandwidth) is being con-
sumed. Agents become more Conciliatory as the quantity of the
resource diminishes. Resource-dependent functions are similar
to time-dependent functions, except that resource-dependent
functions depend on the resource quantity available instead of
the remaining time. There are three categories of resource-
dependent NDFs: Impatient, Steady, and Patient, represent-
ing the patterns of usage of resources. In behavior-dependent
NDFs, an agent generates its proposal by replicating (a portion
of) the previous attitude of its opponent. Nevertheless, since the
model of Faratin et al. only considered bilateral negotiation,
there is no notion of competition and opportunity. Furthermore,
there is no corresponding feature of agents relaxing bargaining
terms in the face of negotiation pressure.
4) G-Commerce: In [3], [7], and [8], two broad resource-
allocation schemes under different market conditions:
1) commodity markets and 2) auctions were examined. In a
commodity market, a consumer purchases a resource from
a pool of available equivalent resources without being able
to specify exactly the required resource. In auction markets,
consumers bid for and purchase specific resources from
resource providers. Using a set of simulated Grids consisting of
resource providers and applications (consumers), Wolski et al.
investigated the effectiveness of both these schemes [3], [7], [8].
However, both auction and commodity markets rely on a trusted
third party to mediate transactions. As pointed out in [3, p. 751],
in a commodity market, the third party (often termed the
market) sets a price for a resource, and queries providers
and consumers for their willingness to transact at that price.
In an auction model, the third party (termed the auctioneer)
gathers bids and resources, and determines the transaction of
an individual resource (or resource bundle) based on the bids.
In contrast, MDAs and EMDAs negotiate without third-party
mediation.
5) Negotiation Agents for Grid Resource Allocation: In ad-
dition to economic models in [3], [7], and [8], there are also
research initiatives (albeit, very few and very new) adopting
negotiation models for Grid resource allocations [10], [16], [17]
(see [41] for a survey). Preliminary work in this area aims to
either integrate methods of negotiation [10] or adapt the nego-
tiation mechanism by selecting from a range of methods [16].
In [10], Chao et al. proposed a two-stage negotiation mech-
anism for the allocation of Grid resources, which combines the
coevolutionary method with the game theory approach. In the
first stage, the mechanism explores the search space of possible
deals to find effective negotiation strategies. In the second stage,
it attempts to find an equilibrium solution using the payoff
matrix of the strategies generated through coevolution in stage
one. Whereas this mechanism combines the strengths of game
theory approach and the coevolutionary method, one of its
weaknesses as pointed out in [10] is that deals cannot be made
during the coevolutionary process.
In [16], Shen et al. proposed a negotiation framework for
Grid resource allocation with a focus on balancing the loads
of computing resources. It was suggested that the negotiation
framework should allow negotiation agents to adapt to specific
computation needs, available resources, and computing loads
by selecting an appropriate negotiation approach from a list of
trading models such as: auction, contract-net, and game theory
based models. Whereas this seems to be an ambitious project,
no empirical or theoretical evaluation was provided because,
like the two-stage negotiation mechanism in [10], (to the best
of the author’s knowledge) Shen et al.’s project is still in its
infancy as this paper is being written.
Additionally, Lawley et al. [17] investigated the use of ne-
gotiation agents for identifying the mutually acceptable terms
among information publishers (providers) and consumers of
message notification services in a Grid computing environment.
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Adopting NDFs in [22], the agents in [17] negotiate on terms
such as frequency, format, and accuracy of information be-
ing delivered by the notification service. Empirical results in
[17] seem to suggest that through negotiation, an information
publisher can balance between the utility (satisfaction) of the
consumers and its workload. Although in some cases, con-
sumers’ utility may be lowered (e.g., receiving less frequent
message updates), lowering its workload (e.g., sending message
updates less frequently) allows a publisher to benefit from serv-
ing more consumers.
Finally, it is noted that some of the very preliminary ideas of
this work are presented in [42]. This work has significantly and
considerably augmented and detailed the preliminary initiative
in [42] as follows.
1) While Sim [42] only presents (very briefly) the general
components of the testbed, this paper provides detailed
descriptions of the testbed, interaction model (Fig. 1), as
well as the negotiation protocol.
2) In [42], only a very small set of results was obtained for
simulations when agents were only subject to different
job deadlines. This work significantly augments and gen-
eralizes the results in [42] by conducting considerably
more experiments with different loadings of the simulated
Grid and different market situations.
VI. CONCLUSION
The novelty and significance of this work are that (to the
best of the author’s knowledge) it is one of the earliest works
that applies a market-driven bargaining model to a G-commerce
environment.
The contribution of this work is showing that MDAs and
EMDAs are appropriate tools for Grid resource negotiation, and
is detailed in the following.
1) In contrast to other related work [3], [7], [8], [10], [16],
[17], this paper not only argues for the need of having
negotiation activities, but also provides justifications for
considering market dynamics in a computational Grid
(see Section I).
2) A testbed (Section III-A) to simulate a Grid computing
environment was developed. Whereas previous testbeds
of MDAs and EMDAs in [24], [26], and [27] consist
of e-markets with only MDAs and EMDAs in a generic
e-commerce environment, the testbed in this work in-
cludes a heterogeneous e-market consisting of MDAs,
EMDAs, NDF, as well as Kasbah agents. The differences
between the author’s previous testbeds in [24], [26],
and [27], and this paper are as follows. The testbed
in [24] consists of only MDAs, and it examined the
impact of deadline, buyer-seller ratio, and spread [6],
[24] (difference between negotiation agents’ proposals)
on the negotiation outcomes of MDAs. The testbeds in
[26] and [27] consist of both MDAs and EMDAs, and
they compared the performance of MDAs and EMDAs in
terms of their success rates in negotiation. The testbed
in this paper compares the performance of MDAs and
EMDAs with NDF and Kasbah agents in a G-commerce
environment.
3) The rationale for comparing MDAs and EMDAs with
Kasbah and NDF is given in Section III-B by showing
that they have quite similar time-dependent strategies.
4) Empirical results (Section IV) show that: 1) in many
different market situations, both MDAs and EMDAs gen-
erally achieve higher budget efficiencies than Kasbah and
NDF-like agents and 2) when there is an extremely high
utilization level of Grid resources, EMDAs are gener-
ally more successful in acquiring resources than MDAs,
Kasbah, and NDF-like agents. These results provide ev-
idence to support the design considerations 1) and 3) in
Section I.
In summary, favorable empirical results suggest that by
taking the market dynamics of the Grid into consideration and
slightly relaxing the bargaining terms under intense negotiation
pressure, EMDAs and MDAs are appropriate mechanisms for
Grid resource allocation. To this end, this work provides an
evidence for showing that negotiation tools for e-commerce
can be adapted for resource negotiation in a computational
Grid—an issue raised in Sim’s position paper [5].
While there is much attention focusing on the software
mechanisms and infrastructures for realizing the Grid vision, to
date, there is little work (e.g., [3], [7], [8], [10], [16], and [17])
that addresses the resource control policies of a computational
Grid. On this account, this paper addresses an essential and
comparatively less explored issue for realizing a computational
Grid. Furthermore, providing an efficient resource allocation
mechanism is a complex undertaking [11], and finding an ap-
propriate economic model for managing Grid resources largely
remains an open problem.
Since considering market dynamics and making tradeoff
decisions are generally not among the current focuses of the
very few (preliminary) initiatives on developing G-negotiation
agents [10], [16], [17], this research does not compete with
the existing related literature, but, rather, it supplements and
complements the very small number of preliminary works in
this novel and emerging area.
Whereas previous theoretical [6], [25], [28] and empirical
results [24], [26], [27] show desirable properties of MDAs and
EMDAs such as stability, negotiating optimally, reacting to
changing market situations, and making tradeoff decisions, this
paper demonstrates an application of MDAs and EMDAs.
Future agenda of this work include: 1) augmenting the
heterogeneous testbed with other types of e-negotiation agents
with learning capabilities (e.g., [43] and [44]) and 2) consider-
ing G-negotiation agents that negotiate not only for the cost of
providing the service but also the desired level of service.
Finally, it is hoped that this paper will shed new light and
inspire others in finding an appropriate economic model for
Grid resource allocation.
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